Virtue Ethics

Richard Norman

Ancestries

Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Duties (and Rights): Immanuel Kant

Virtues: Plato and Aristotle

Platoπs list of virtues

Wisdom

Courage

Moderation (åtemperanceπ)

Justice

Aristotleπs list of virtues

Courage

Moderation (temperance)

Liberality (generosity)

Self-respect

Good temper

Sincerity, honesty

Friendship

etc.

A previous mention of åthe virtuesπ

Hare: because of our limitations, we shall not produce the greatest preference-satisfaction by doing a utilitarian calculation on each occasion when we act.  Rather, we should cultivate in ourselves good dispositions, and act on these.

A two-level utilitarianism: what makes these dispositions good dispositions is that acting on them will maximize utility.

(åVirtue-utilitarianismπ)

Philippa Foot, åUtilitarianism and the Virtuesπ

The utilitarian account of the virtues gets things the wrong way round.

Utilitarians assume that there is such a thing as åa good state of affairsπ, åthe best outcomeπ, go on to argue that this is åthe greatest happinessπ, åmaximum satisfaction of preferencesπ etc.

But the assumption is what we should question.

It makes no sense to talk of a state of affairs as åa good thingπ in the abstract.

Something can be åa good thingπ only from a certain point of view, a certain perspective.

From åthe moral point of viewπ?  But what is this?

The greatest happiness may be åa good state of affairsπ from the point of view of benevolence.  But benevolence is only one of the virtues. There are also friendship, justice, honesty etc.

So itπs not that the virtues are good qualities because they help to produce the greatest happiness.

Rather, it is from the moral point of view, the point of view of the virtues, that we can see it as åa good state of affairsπ if people are benefited.

Virtues and åeudaimoniaπ

Why are the virtues good qualities to have?

Because they are qualities which any human being needs.

Aristotle: we need them for åeudaimoniaπ ≠ åhappinessπ (?), flourishing.

A form of ethical naturalism:

Plants need water.

Dogs need to be taken for walks.

Human beings need the virtues.  They cannot flourish without them.

Contrast utilitarianism.  The virtues are components of oneπs own eudaimonia.

The virtues and action

How can virtue ethics guide our actions, help us to decide what to do?

åI should help her because I want to be kindπ?

åI should tell him the truth because I want to be honestπ?

But this looks like a kind of åmoral egoismπ ≠ seeing others as means to oneπs own virtue.

Perhaps virtue-words apply directly to actions themselves, rather than to the character of the agent.

åDo this because it is the kind thing to doπ, åTell the truth because it is the honest thing to doπ, åRescue the drowning person because it is a courageous thing to doπ.

But:

Then how does this differ from e.g. Rossπs prima facie duties?

It still seems to put the emphasis in the wrong place.  I should help someone because he needs help, not because it would be kind or courageous to help him.

Perhaps a two-level theory:

What kind of person should I try to be?  Kind, honest, courageous, just, etc.

What (as a kind, honest, courageous, just person) should I do?  Fulfil my obligations, respond to other peopleπs needs, respect peopleπs rights, etc.

Conclusion

The virtues are part of the story.

But we need other moral concepts ≠ obligations and duties, needs, interests, rights, etc.

A pluralist normative theory.