Varieties of Utilitarianism
Richard Norman
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Meta-ethics / Normative Ethics
Meta-ethics: What are we doing (what do we mean) when we say that something is good or bad, right or wrong?
Normative ethics: What sorts of things are good and bad, right and wrong?
Utilitarianism
Normative ethics out of fashion in 1940s and 1950s.
Modern debate begins with re-emergence of utilitarianism in 1960s.
R M Hare, Freedom and Reason, 1963
Later version in 1989 article
How defend a normative theory?
Argument from first principles
Argument from our considered moral convictions the theory makes best sense of our moral intuitions.
(Reflective equilibriumı Rawls)
Hare employs both 1 and 2.
Hareıs argument
Starts with formal question (meta-ethics), ends with substantial conclusion (normative ethics).
Then tries to show that the normative theory is also consistent with our moral intuitions.
The steps in the argument from first principles (summarised p.186)
The logic of moral words (a) prescriptivity and (b) universalizability
The relevance of facts
What it is to know how someone is suffering
By combining 3 with universalizability, we arrive at utilitarianism.
Look critically at each step.
Step 1(a): Prescriptivity
Hare: moral language is action-guiding
Saying You oughtı is telling someone to do something (like a command, an imperativeı)
Saying I oughtı is committing myself to action If I sincerely think that I ought to do X, then I will do X.
(Hare a non-cognitivist, but wants to avoid crude expressivism.)
Step 1(a): Prescriptivity
[Question to consider:
Is this too tight a link between moral language and action?
Canıt I sincerely and consistently say e.g. I know I ought to apologise, but I donıt want to, and Iım not going toı ?]
Step 1(b): Universalizability
Cf. Kant.
Oughts entail universal principles.
Saying that it is right for me to do X commits me to saying that it would be right for you to do X in the same circumstances.
Saying that you ought to do X commits me to saying that I ought to do X in the same circumstances.
Step 1(b): Universalizability
Hare: put together prescriptivity and universalizability If I wouldnıt want someone to do X to me, then I canıt say that itıs right for me to do it to him.
Hare is trying to build concern for other peopleıs interests into the logic of moral words.
Step 1(b): Universalizability
[Question to consider:
Isnıt Hare confusing consistency, impartiality, and altruistic concern?
Canıt I consistently say You ought to apologise. If I were in your position I wouldnıt want to apologise, but itıs still what you ought to do.ı?
Recall Hareıs distinction between formal and substantial questions.]
Step 2: Facts
Hare: Facts are not part of the meaning of moral terms (naturalism). Fact/value distinction.
But in deciding what to do, we need factual beliefs. We need to know what we would be doing, that is, what the consequences would be.
Consequentialism a component of utilitarianism.
Step 2: Facts
[Question: Isnıt Hare running together facts about the actionı and facts about its consequencesı?
Of course we canıt ignore consequences but not all facts about actions are facts about their consequences.
E.g. This action would be dishonest.ı]
Step 3: Suffering and knowing
Hare: To know the facts about an action, I need to know what suffering it will produce.
[But are these the only relevant facts? Hare seems to smuggle in this assumption.]
Knowing how someone is suffering involves knowing what it is like for her, putting yourself in her situation.
Knowing how much someone is suffering = being committed to the preference that, if I were in her situation, I would want the suffering to stop, with the same strength of preference as hers.
Step 4: Suffering + Universalizability
Suppose I want to do X but know it will cause suffering for someone.
Knowing how he is suffering = wanting it to stop if I were in his situation.
If I wouldnıt want someone to do X to me, then I canıt say that itıs right for me to do it to him. (Universalizability)
How resolve the contradiction?
Step 4: Suffering + Universalizability
Hare: the rational way to resolve the contradiction is to let the stronger preference override the weaker.
Conclusion: the right action is that which will maximize the satisfaction of preferences.
Preference-satisfaction utilitarianism
(Classical utilitarianism: the right action is that which will maximize happiness.)
Preference-satisfaction utilitarianism
[Questions to consider:
Why assume that all conflicts are conflicts of preferences? Canıt there be conflicts between moral principles and preferences?
Why assume that the only way to resolve conflicts is to maximize? Shouldnıt some commitments override others because they are right?]
Criticism of Hare
At each step he smuggles in unacknowledged assumptions.
He relies on these assumptions to get from formal premises to substantial conclusions.
He is trying to show that utilitarianism is built into the logic of moral words. But it isnıt.
Second way of arguing for utilitarianism
Argument from our considered moral convictions the theory makes best sense of our moral intuitions.
Utilitarianism looks intuitively attractive.
Right thing to do is what will do the most good.
Doing the most good = making things better for people, i.e. promoting their happiness or well-being, preventing suffering.
Intuitions
But
There are counter-examples to utilitarianism which also seem intuitively plausible.
Actions which might have the best consequences but would be wrong, e.g.
Breaking a promise when no one will find out.
Punishing an innocent person.
Dealing with counter-examples
Hare and others think utilitarianism can deal with counter-examples by giving a role to rules.
Look at distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism
(Smart: extreme utilitarianismı and restricted utilitarianismı)
Dealing with counter-examples
Intuitive common-sense morality: follow moral rules such as
Donıt break promises.
Donıt tell lies.
Donıt kill.
Donıt punish the innocent.
Dealing with counter-examples
Utilitarians: the reason why we should (normally) follow these rules is that doing so will usually have the best consequences.
Why? Hare, Smart:
Often we donıt have time to calculate the consequences.
We are liable to be biased in our own favour.
Smart: rules of thumb
Hare: dispositions, principles
Rules of thumb
We need to make a direct utilitarian calculation of consequences
When two rules conflict.
In our reflective critical thinking, to decide what the best rules are.
But: If we do have time to calculate the consequence, and we are confident that we are not being biased, and we are certain that breaking the rule will have the best consequences, then we should break the rule.
Smartıs example of desert island promise.
Rule-utilitarianism
A stronger role for rules:
Generalized rule-utilitarianism: Act on those rules the general acceptance of which would have the best consequences.
Act-utilitarian counter-argument:
GRU either collapses into AU or is superstitious rule-worship.
Generalized rule-utilitarianism
Donıt walk on the grass.
AU: Itıs OK to break the rule occasionally if you can be certain that people wonıt generally walk on the grass.
GRU: If everyone walked on the grass it would have bad consequences, so you shouldnıt do it.
Generalized rule-utilitarianism
But: suppose we build more detail into the rule. Donıt walk on the grass unless you can be certain that no one else will.ı
General acceptance of this rule will not have bad consequences.
But then GRU calculation of the detailed rule is the same as AU calculation of the consequences of the individual act.
So GRU collapses into AU.
Generalized rule-utilitarianism
Suppose GRU insists on considering only broad simple rules.
Why insist on the simple rule, if general acceptance of the more detailed rule would have better consequences?
Isnıt this superstitious rule-worship? Why should any kind of utilitarian think that way.
Utilitarianism and common-sense morality
If we reject GRU, is utilitarianism then still vulnerable to intuitive counter-examples?
Would it justify actions which we think are in fact wrong?