Modern Moral Philosophy: Lecture Five (week 17)
1. So far...
(a) Weıve been thinking about metaphysics, really, about whether ethical properties exist. Weıre now going to switch tack and talk about the link between ethical motivation and ethical judgement. We havenıt got chance to do both important parts, but only one. Hereıs an explanation of how this material fits with the metaphysics, though, so you can follow it up in the Miller.
(b) Topics: (i) internalism and externalism about ethical motivation (this week)
(ii) challenge to the neo-Humean belief-desire account of psychology (in Miller, pp. )
2. Why are we Discussing this?
(c) Neo-Humean belief-desire psychological framework is very plausible. Recall that noncogs are (traditionally) Humeans. (Recall week 15, (l) and (m).) In fact, positions split into three key ones:
(i) Accept H. bel-des; ethical judgements are expressions of des/att = noncog.
(ii) Accept H. bel-des; ethical judgements are expressions of belief = externalist (about ethical
motivation) and moral realists (more often than not, IMRealists e.g. Brink).
(iii) Reject H bel-des.; eth. judgements are cognitive (sort of beliefs) = sensibility theorists
This is all very important for values, as you see if you read Miller. We will explore internalism versus externalism about moral motivation, thus knocking out a sort of realism, which is often IMR. If you assume that internalism wins, then you can make a decision between neo-Humeanism and non-Humeanism, which matches nicely onto expressivism and sensibility theory.
3. So, what are these Positions?
(d) From now on, internalists about ethical motivationı = internalistsı. Ditto for externalists.
Internalists think that there is a necessary or internalı connection between judging something to be good and being motivated to act appropriately on that judgement. More formally, they think:
If S (legitimately) judges f-ing to be good then, as a matter of necessity, she will be motivated to f.
Externalists deny this. They claim something such as:
If S (legitimately) judges f-ing to be good then it is not a matter of necessity that she will be motivated to f. At most, if S is motivated to act appropriately then this is a contingent matter.
Notes: (i) There is no claim by internalists that the motivation will be the strongest motivation.
(ii) Nor that S will definitely act (external forces might prevent her).
(iii) Nor does the debate rest on any judgement being correct. We are concerned only with the link between judgement (true or false) and motivation. And weıre assuming that weıre dealing with sincere judgements, not lies or play-acting or somesuch.
(iv) Internalistı means something different here from what it means in, say, epistemology. Also, different from that used in philosophy of mind.
(v) The legitimatelyı in brackets will come up again in a moment.
(vi) Often the conceptual connection is thought to be defeasible (see Smith). So, either...the internalist claim...or S is practically irrational (e.g. accidie, which deserves special treatment on its own - although note that externalists can give a nice account of such cases along with the normı, which counts in favour of externalism).
(e) Modalities. We could live in a world where, as it happens, everyone is motivated to some extent to act appropriately on their ethical judgements, and externalism still be true. (People could, as it happens, have the appropriate desires to go with judgements they make.) We are debating whether there is some interesting conceptual connection between ethical judgement and motivation. Of course, in such a world externalism might seem dubious as there are no clear counter-examples to internalism (i.e. someone legitimately judging ethically, yet failing to be motivated). But thatıs modalities for you.....
4. Beginning the Debate
(f) But externalists do have a clear counter-example. Amoralists seem perfectly possibility, and surely many of them exist. An amoralist = someone who makes an ethical judgement, but feels no motivation (so amoralists arenıt people who make no ethical judgements whatsoever).
(g) But is the amoralist such a possibility? One challenge is just to say that amoralists are not making ethical judgements at all. Rather they are reporting (describing) what other people take to be good. However, even if this is true for some amoralists, it need not be true for all. It doesnıt take amoralism seriously enough in my view. So what to say in favour of internalism?
5. Michael Smithıs Argument for Internalism
(h) In his (1994) pp. 60-76 (but also see pp. 77-91) Smith says that amoralists attempt to make legitimate ethical judgements but fail in an interesting way. His claim is that externalism canıt explain the normal link between legitimate ethical judgements and motivation and so should be rejected.
(i) Christopher Peacockeıs colour machineı example. Internalists think that mastery of ethical terms essentially (necessarily) involves being motivated to act appropriately; externalists deny this. Here we have an impasse over what is a legitimate ethical judgement. Any way forward?
(k) Consider Eric and Ernie. Can externalists explain the norm, the norm of good, strong-willed (normal-willedı) people (the change in motivation that very often accompanies a change in judgement)? This is, after all, the normal case. Well, yes they can, but they explain it by saying that Eric is motivated to do the good (or right, etc.) de dicto, not de re. Good de re refers to specific instances of the good. Good de dicto means the idea of goodness itself. So, externalists explain Eric thus (remember, this might not be what it feels like to Eric, but weıre after the most plausible theoretical explanation of his situation): Eric has a desire to give to charity, but this desire is a derivative desire. All that Eric cares about is doing (the) good de dicto. This preserves externalismıs commitments above concerning ethical motivation: there is no necessary connection between judging that something is good de re and being motivated to act appropriately. Instead: ethically good people have motivations to do what is good de dicto, they see that a certain action is good de dicto, and they are motivated to do it because of this.
(l) Internalist challenge: Is this the best way to characterize the norm? On the externalist reading:
(i) The good person is alienated from her ends. Smith thinks that having desires concerning the good de dicto is fetishisticı: we have desires concerning our family, friends, peopleıs various plights, etc. We do not have desires concerning the good de dicto.
(ii) Indeed, can one have desires about goodness de dicto? Empty commitment? This neutralizes worries with Smith regarding changes in motivation. Examples of Lucy and Luke.
6. Is Smithıs Argument any Good?
(m) As well as Smith, see Dreier (2000) in the recommended reading. Here, Iım just going to set out another two criticisms from Alex Miller in his book.
(n) Smaller worry: re note (d)(vi) above. Is Smith entitled to this manoeuvre? We need some explanation about what it is that connects all of the cases that are exempt and which are practically irrationalı. Otherwise it just renders the internalist thesis trivial. (There is a conceptual connection between judgement and motivation in all the cases where there is one, the others being cases where someone is practically irrational, that is where there isnıt such a connection.ı) But, Miller assumes that this can be solved and moves onto
(o) Smithıs arg calls for a radical overhaul of our notion of ethical judgement, and it undermines internalism as much as externalism. Smith thinks that an externalist explanation of Eric will construe him as being fetishistic. But internalism seems to involve fetishism also. It seems that Eric, according to internalists, isnıt normally motivated to do x (where x is a specific possible action), but Eric is motivated to do x because it is good (de re). The worry seems to be that we need more idea of what is so bad about ethical fetishism. It seems to amount to the charge that one doesnıt do x simply because it is x, but one does it for a reason, because it is of a certain kind. Externalists construe this ethical reason de dicto, internalists de re, but that doesnıt seem so important. (This, says Miller, implies that the notion of ethical judgementı drops out of the picture. Someone is non-fetishistic if they decide to do x for no reason, although it might well turn out x is good.) In other words, the charge of fetishismı is rhetoric, which, if it has any bite, seems to bite internalists as well as externalists.
7. Questions and extra work
(i) Make sure you understand why we are discussing this topic this week. Read Miller if you need help.
(ii) Is Smith right to say that the motivation accompanying judgement is the normı? Is this a statistical norm? Or is there something evaluative going on, something along the lines of this is the proper sort of case to which all the others should be comparedı? (Isnıt that last formulation slightly sly and trivializes his strategy?) Does any of this matter?
(iii) What is the difference between de re and de dicto? Do you think that this distinction is a good one for Smith to draw on?
(iv) What do you think of Smithıs claim that being motivated by the good de dicto is fetishistic? Isnıt this just a metaphor and is Smith being sly here? Whatıs wrong, if anything, with being motivated to do the good de dicto? What do you think of Millerıs argument?