Reading: *Richard Rorty, 'The Priority of Philosophy to Democracy; reprinted in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski, Blackwell, (1990)*

*'Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism'* in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Cambridge U.P.

John Gray, *'Enlightenment's Wake'* and *'Agonistic Liberalism'* in Enlightenment's Wake, Routledge 1995.

Mulhall and Swift, chapter 8

Topic: one liberal response has been to argue that communitarianism has focused on the issue of what the foundations of liberal theory are and that this is a bad question. Liberalism does not need foundations of any kind and a rejection of foundationalism in philosophy generally should benefit those who want to defend liberalism. This is Richard Rorty's argument; John Gray's slightly different argument takes MacIntyrean assumptions and tries to defend liberalism as just one form of life amongst others, but our form of life.

First Excerpt: 'Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism'

1 Pp 198-9 explains the commitments of the postmodern bourgeois liberal. What are they?

2 Why does Rorty believe that a liberal form of life does not need any theoretical underpinning? Is he right?

3 Does it follow from what Rorty argues that his defence of liberalism is merely pragmatic and therefore relativistic?

Second Excerpt: 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy'

4 Pp 177-8 describes three kinds of communitarian argument. Describe them and attribute them to philosophers you have already studied on this course.

5 Pp 179-183 gives a non-foundational reading of Rawls. Is it convincing?

6 On what grounds does Rorty reject Sandel's interpretation of Rawls at pp.184-192? Why does it follow that "democracy is prior to philosophy"?

Third Excerpt: John Gray, 'Agonistic Liberalism'

7 Pp 64-8 explains how "traditional" liberalism failed when the "Enlightenment project" of grounding liberalism on a theory of human nature failed. Are you persuaded by this argument?

8 Pp 73-79 raises specific points of contrast between Gray's own 'agonistic' liberalism and Rawls's liberalism. What are they?

9 Why doesn't Gray think that his view is relativistic? (Pp 80-84) Would it be fair to classify it as conservative?

Fourth Excerpt: Gray's 'Enlightenment's Wake'

10 On page 156 Gray describes what political criticism must be like after the collapse of the 'Enlightenment project'. What are its key features?

11 Pp 172-8 explains why, in Gray's view, Rorty has not escaped to a genuinely post-foundational liberalism. Give his reasons and explain whether or not you agree.

12 Pp 178-184 presents Gray's indictment of universalist liberalism and his prescription for the appropriate attitude we should take to "inner" and "outer" nature alike - a non-instrumental one. Do you think it is possible to construct a political theory on such a basis?

 Reading: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia U.P. (1993), especially *'The Public Use of Reason'*.

*Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge U.P. (1996), esp. chapters 6, 7 and 10.*

Topic: Rawls claims that the internal development of his own views owes nothing to the communitarian critique of liberalism. That may be so, but his own work thematises issues of history and sociology that parallel communitarian concerns. In this seminar we will look at the motivations for the shift to political liberalism and the parallel work of Charles Larmore.

Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism

1 "The best approach [to defining liberalism] lies in keeping in mind the basic problems that liberal thought has sought to solve". p. 121-122. What are these problems and do you agree with Larmore's proposal?

2 "Acknowledging reasonable disagreement about the good life need not lead to scepticism". p.122. Why not?

3 Pp. 123-4. What is a minimal moral conception? In what respects is it a neutral conception? (pp 125-7)

4 How can the political liberal accommodate civic republican emphases on the value of active citizenship? (p.124)

5 Pp. 127-130 Why cannot liberalism rest on either Kant and Mill's celebration of autonomy or the complementary desire for belonging?

6 Pp 132-133 In what way is political liberalism a mean between two other extreme positions?

7 Pp 134-136 It turns out that Larmore has something specific in mind as the content of his moral conception of neutrality. What are his two key principles? Do you think they are neutral enough?

8 Pp 138-141 Larmore explains why the norm of equal respect can be detached from the rest of Kant's moral basis for liberalism. Explain how Larmore thinks this is possible.

9 Pp 141 -144 In what way can Larmore's liberalism involve the value of community?

10 Larmore gives an extended interpretation of Rawls's political liberalism. Must it, as Larmore suggest, be grounded on the norm of equal respect?

Rawls on the Public Use of Reason

1 Pp. 213-220 What is the public use of reason? What is the basic paradox of public reason, and why does Rawls believe it is not a paradox?

2 Pp 221-222 What are non-public reasons? Why does the liberal state permit them?

3 Pp 223-227 What is the content of public reasons?

4 What constitutional essentials are appropriately the subject of public reasons?

5 Pp 241 What problems does Rawls envisage for this conception? How does he believe that they will be overcome?

6 P 252. In what ways are the ideas of public reason and of a political conception of justice mutually supporting?

Reading: Ronald Dworkin, *'Justice for Hedgehogs'*.

Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford U.P. (1986) *Excerpts*

Mulhall and Swift, chapters 9 and 10.

Topics: some liberal theorists have reacted by accommodating the claims of community in their own liberal theories while rejecting aspects of both Rawls's views (notably his anti-perfectionism) and aspects of communitarianism. Both Raz and Dworkin have been at the forefront of the development of such "new wave" liberalisms. This week we will look at their most recent theories.

First Reading: Raz

A The Exclusion of Ideals

1 Pp 157-8 What are Dworkin's anti-perfectionist intuitions?

2 In what way does Raz believes that these intuitions are confused? He gives three grounds (p 158-162)

B The Nature of Rights

1 What is the basic definition of a right? P 266

2 Pp. 176-80. What sorts of entity have the capacity for rights?

C Autonomy and Pluralism

1 What is the ideal of autonomy? Explain why it is not, in Raz's view, necessarily connected to unity in a life. Pp 370-371 and 385.

2 What are the "conditions of autonomy"? Are they really necessary conditions, or could someone be autonomous in their absence?

3 P. 380 Are autonomous bad people worse than non-autonomous bad people?

D Freedom and Autonomy

1 How does Raz see his autonomist perfectionism as giving a deeper rationale for the harm principle? Pp.

2 In what way does Raz view the state as permissibly paternalistic? Pp 423-424

Second Reading: Ronald Dworkin, 'Justice for Hedgehogs'

A 'Section 2; Integrity and Democracy'

1 Page 2. What two tests must constructed conceptions of democracy, equality and liberty pass?

2 Pages 3-4. Why does Rawls's political liberalism aim at an unattainable ideal?

3 What are Dworkin's two cardinal humanist principles? Pages 5-6.

B 'Section 3: Equality and Liberty'

1 Governments should be "motivationally equal". What does that mean? (p.11)

2 Dworkin discusses four means of assessing property settlements. Pages 13-15 gives the answer he prefers. How is it related to his two initial humanist principles? What is "equality in the costs of choice"?

3 Page 16 explains how the accounts of liberty follow from that of democracy. What two kinds of immunity from collective authority must people have?

4 The section "liberty in general" pp. 18-21, rejects the general idea of negative liberty - freedom from constraint and coercion. Dworkin objects that this does not explain why liberty is a value. Assess Dworkin's positive account given at the end of page 19.

5 Is Dworkin's humanist individualism hostile to the values of community? Explain the way in which it is and the way in which it is not in connection with pages 21-22. Is this a fair account of communitarianism?

C 'Section 4: Integrity's Value and Value's Integrity'

1 Dworkin believes that our moral and political values hang together in a coherent system. This view is challenged by a belief in radical value pluralism, such as that pioneered by Isaiah Berlin which we have seen on this course in the work of John Gray. Explain what the view is (p.23, 25/6).

2 Explain why "conflicts in personal values do not translate into political conflicts" so that Dworkin's view is immune to the value pluralists objection.

Reading: Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues, Oxford U.P. (1997);

Phillip Pettit, Republicanism, Oxford U.P. (1997);

*Alan Thomas, 'Liberal Republicanism and Civil Society', Democratization, vol. 4, no. 3, (Autumn, 1997), pp. 26-44.'

*Quentin Skinner, 'The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty'*

Topic: Some wise philosophers, including my good self, are of the view that the "lesson" of the communitarian critique of liberalism is that liberalism needs to give an account of its own preconditions, especially civil society and citizenship. The embedded account of citizenship is going to be drawn from the republican tradition, but not itself a privileged focus of the good life - hence the distance between this view and Taylor's.

A Quentin Skinner, 'The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty'

1 What is Hobbes's view of liberty and how has it influenced contemporary discussion of the subject? (pp 294-96)

2 There is a tradition that suggests Hobbes cannot be right - although not a tradition Skinner agrees with. What is that tradition and what is its central claim about liberty? (pp 296-298)

3 Pp 299 - 301 Why does Skinner think it is a mistake to claim that the concept of liberty is ambiguous?

4 Pp 300-301 A person can only be free in a free republic with free institutions. Why do the civic republicans not conclude that people must always promote the good of the republic?

5 P. 303 What is the republican understanding of civic virtue? How do they use law to overcome our "corruption"?

6 Is this theory a variation on the negative liberty theory? (pp 306-7)

B 'Liberal Republicanism and the Role of Civil Society' by Me. (For the very keen, this is now part of chapter 12 of Value and Context, Oxford University Press, 2006)

1 Pp 26-7 What connection does this author envisage between political liberalism and civic republicanism?

2 Pp 27-8 What are the central problems of modern political theory?

3 Pp 28-9 What are the grounds for being a political liberal?

4 P 30 What sort of individualism does this form of liberalism involve?

5 Pp 30-31 Why must the liberal develop a theory of citizenship?

6 Pp 33 Why should a liberal be concerned with civil society?

7 Pp 34-5 What are the different features of elite and participatory models of democracy? Which should the political liberal favour?

8 Pp 35-7 suggest that the liberal should be concerned with the associational networks of civil society. Why?

9 Pp 36-8 Is this appeal to the concept of civil society just as vulnerable to Taylor's communitarian critique as other concepts central to liberalism?