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This page is divided into three main sections: Research, Employment History and Educational Record.
 
 
(1) Research
  

My main areas of research are moral and political philosophy and the philosophy of mind, especially the problem of consciousness. You can download my current cv here.

 

A full list of publications follows, with links to pdfs of the penultimate drafts of published papers. These drafts are provided in the tradition of making single copies of papers, available for fair use, for private study purposes. Please refer to and quote from the published versions which will have the correct pagination. You may need to download Adobe's free Acrobat Reader from here if you do not have it installed already: http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep.html
You can move around within the Research section using these links to Books, Papers, Work in Progress, Conference/Seminar Papers,
Reference Works, Editorial Work, Reviews, Other Publications, Presentations to Departments, Graduates Supervised, Membership of Professional Organisations, Conferences Organised, Refereeing/External Examining

 

Publications: Books

 

 
 

2016 Republic of Equals: Pre-distribution and Property-Owning Democracy, Oxford University Press (USA) To appear in the series 'Oxford Political Philosophy' edited by Samuel Freeman

 
 

2008 (December) Thomas Nagel, Acumen Press and McGill-Queen's University Press. Following the acquisition of Acumen by Routledge issued as a Kindle edition (Routledge) 2015.

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picture of Thomas Nagel
 
 

2007 Editor and contributor, Bernard Williams (Cambridge University Press).

HB: ISBN-13: 9780521662161

PB: ISBN-13: 9780521665551

Multi-author volume including papers by John Skorupski, Adrian Moore, Burt Louden, Michael Stocker, Tony Long, Edward Craig. Includes editorial 'Introduction' (7 000 words).

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Links to Reviews:

John Cottingham in Ethics.

Catherine Wilson in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

 

 

Williams
 

2006Value and Context: the Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge, (Clarendon Press, Oxford), ISBN 0198250177.

(Paperback edition in 2010.)

Table of Contents and further details here.

The full text is available at Oxford Scholarship Online.

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Links to Reviews: Jason Kawall in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Alasdair MacIntyre in The Journal of Moral Philosophy.

Timothy Chappell in Philosophical Quarterly. (Critical Notice.)

James Swindal in the Review of Metaphysics.

Other Reviews:

Willem Lemmens in Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71:2, p. 427-8.


book cover
 
 
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Papers

 
  Under Review [Unpublished] 'Principle Monism and the Structure of Moral Justification', Current status: Revise and resubmit.
  Abstract: This paper further develops a critique of Brad Hooker's claim that his rule consequentialism employs a novel theory of justification. In Hooker's view the relations between moral intuitions, mid-level prima facie principles and the rule consequentitalist principle do not represent fixed epistemic relations of priority or dependence. I objected (in Thomas [2000]) that this made the rule consequentialist principle explanatorily idle; Jeffrey Brand-Ballard developed a response on Hooker's behalf. [Brand-Ballard, 2007] Brand-Ballard argued that two co-extensive theories may nevertheless be distinguished by appealing to further, intensional features or by their relative simplicity so my critique of Hooker does not go through. This paper re-states my objection in a new form: by abandoning any modal content, the relation noted in Hooker's view is merely a co-variation and co-variations are in no way explanatory. Since normative theories aim at the generation of normative explanations, Hooker's view is not a theory at all. In the relevant sense the two co-varying claims are neither more, nor less, relatively simple than each other.
 
 
  2015 [35] 'Rawls and Political Realism: Realistic Utopianism or Judgement in Bad Faith?', European Journal of Political Theory, online firstr
  Abstract: This paper assesses the so called "political realists" critique of Rawls. Drawing an analogy with Hegel's critique of Kant it is argued that the charges of emptiness and abstraction cannot be sustained given that Rawls's conception of a property-owning democracy fully specifies one institutional blueprint for a just society..
 
  2013 [34] 'Sen's Critique of Rawls's "Transcendental Institutionalism"', European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 241-263
  Abstract: This paper assesses Amartya Sen's critique of Rawls's putative "transcendental institutionalism". It is argued that Sen's critiques of Rawls depend on uncharitable interpretations of his views, notably filtered through the influence of Cohen. Rawls is defended from the charge of narrow institutionalism, of merely stipulating full compliance, and of seeking a perfect theory of justice. A correct understanding of what Rawls meant by "ideal theory" shows that Sen's comparativism may lead us to adopt policies that do not, in fact, serve the goal of justice construed as an integrated whole.
 
 
  2014 [33] 'Integrity, Ground Projects and Reasons to be Moral', in Why Be Moral?, forthcoming, edited by Burt Louden and Beatrix Himmelmann
  Abstract: This paper aThis paper assesses the connections that Bernard Williams drew between an internal conception of reasons for action, ground projects and the idea of acting from integrity. These ideas are applied to his treatment of the topic 'Why Be Moral?' and related to his late discussion of the importance of ground projects in Truth and Truthfulness.
 
 
  2015 [32] 'Prerogatives and the Scope of Justice: A Reply to Berkey', Mind, July 2015
  Abstract: This paper further develops the critique of G. A. Cohen's objection to Rawlsian special incentives. In his sympathetic treatment of the arguments of Thomas [2011] Brian Berkey nonetheless believes that the institutionalist response to Cohen presented in that paper is unsatisfactory and a prerogatives based approach much more promising. This 'Reply' develops my critique of Cohen further and responds to Berkey's argument.
 
  2013 [31] 'McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and Error Theory', International Journal for the Study of Scepticism.
  Abstract:John McDowell has recently changed his anti-sceptical strategy from one of therapeutic dissolution to one of limited engagment. We can go deeply enough into the motivations of the philosophical sceptic about our knowledge of the external world to refute it. But we do so in a way that demonstrates the mistake that the sceptic makes even to her by presenting a transcendental argument from an assumption that the sceptic shares. This paper evaluates this new strategy and the extent to which it depends on McDowell's interpretationism. To this end the argument is compared to a interpretationist response to error theory in ethics.
 
  2012 [30] 'Giving Each Her Due: Taurek Cases and Non-comparative Justice', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
  Abstract: Taurek's claim that a rescuer in a Taurek case may permissibly act to save the one is defended by appealing to Joel Feinberg's distinction between comparative and non-comparative justice.
  This paper is open access. Download a copy here.
 
  2012 [29] 'Rawls, Adam Smith, and an Argument From Complexity To Property Owning Democracy',The Good Society.
  Abstract: This paper identifies a key argument from A Theory of Justice that supports Rawls's ideal of a property owning democracy. Epistemic complexity makes it impossible to regulate market transactions atomistically; the only way to make a market fair is to rig its structure so as to make its effects fair. This argument, tracked through, also supports one way of construing what Rawls meant by a property owning democracy and explains why his putative choice between property owning democracy and market socialism is likely to be decisively determined in favour of a POD.
 
 

2011 [28] 'Virtue Ethics and the Ethics of Care', Eidos.

  Abstract: This paper surveys virtue ethics and an ethics of care in order to determine their mutual relationship. It is argued that care ethics is actually a part of a congnitivist tradition within virtue ethics. For all its insights it is an internal corrective within, and not an alternative to, virtue ethics.
 
  2011[27] 'Cohen's Critique of Rawls: A Double Counting Objection', Mind.
  Abstract: This paper examines G A Cohen's critique of Rawlsian special incentives. It is argued that he has two basic arguments: one from the limited scope of prerogatives and one from the limited scope of justice. The former argument is identified and argued to be largely immune to the 'basic structure' response to Cohen. Nevertheless, it introduces a second order moral rigorism that makes his argument unsuccessful. The second argument from the limited scope of justice can be derived from two other arguments, namely, the argument that Rawls was committed to moral dualism and Nagel's idea of a moral division of labour. Scheffler's recent argument that Rawls was not a moral dualist is endorsed, however, it is pointed out that this does not in itself block Cohen's claim that decisions to market one's labour fall outside the scope of justice. (The moral division of labour, by contrast, is simply mis-applied in support of Cohen's thesis.) It is argued that Cohen overlooks the way in which Rawls places market relation in a context that structures them, by presupposition, in such a way that they are made just. Presupposing justice is not to discount justice and a restricted scope of application is not a restriction on the scope of justification. On that basis a person who has consented to a property settlement for his or her society being organised along Rawlsian lines, who finds him or her self amongst the better off in a distribution, has already met the demands of justice. Applying those demands via a supplementary ethos of justice is therefore double counting its demands and unreasonably demanding.
 
  2014 [26] (forthcoming) 'Should Generalism be Our Regulative Ideal?' in Theory and Anti-theory in Ethics, ed T. D. C. Chappell, Oxford University Press.
  Abstract: Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge have developed a sophisticated defence of generalism as a regulative ideal. This paper assesses their proposal. Absent a privileged epistemic source for principles they seek to establish their regulative generalism via either a transcendental argument or an inference to the best explanation. They establish the independently interesting result that, if anything can be a moral reason, there can be no hedged principles in ethics. However, it is argued that their basic argument is flawed as it overlooks the alternative of taking the list of possible defeaters to a moral judgement to be indefinite, neither finite nor infinite. It also follows from their historicism and fallibilism that all the principles of which we have knowledge (past and present) all come out false.
 
  2013 [25] (forthcoming) 'Is Practical Reasoning Essentially First Personal?' in Partiality and Impartiality in Ethics, eds John Cottingham, Brian Feltham, Philip Stratton-Lake, Oxford University Press.
  Abstract: An interpretation is developed of Williams's claim that practical reasoning is essentially first personal. It is argued that the only rationale strong enough to sustain this claim is that practical reasoning is both typically non-monotonic and concludes in an action as Aristotle argued. The point of practical reasoning is to act and for the event that is one's action to be the expression of one's conclusion. This requires the detachment of an unconditional conclusion downstream from practical deliberation/intention formation. The Aristotelian thesis is defended as the best explanation of the fact that in reasoning about practice things may come out variously: an expression of a practical conclusion is a more determinate specification of an agent's intention from amongst a range circumscribed by the agent's aims. It is concluded that an impartialism explained via the idea of an informational restriction cannot give either a complete account of reasons or of reasoning.
  There is a pre-print of this paper at the Ethics Etc blog here.
 
  2011 [24] 'Nietzsche and Moral Fictionalism', in C. Janaway and S. J. Robertson (eds.) Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity, Oxford University Press.
  Abstract: This paper evaluates interpretations of Nietzsche's meta-ethics as a form of moral fictionalism. It does so, in part, by evaluting moral fictionalism as a free-standing meta-ethical view. It is argued that fictionalism faces insuperable difficulties in both its reductive and non-reductive versions although these problems do not generalise to fictionalism about other domains. Nietzsche is better interpreted as a "subjective realist" who is particularly concerned with subjective conditions on the process of valuing and, in particular, with what it is to be unable to set any values as ends worthy of pursuit.
 
  2010 [23] 'Alienation, Objectivity and the Primacy of Virtue' in J. Webber (ed), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism, Routledge.
  Abstract: This paper interprets Sartre's ethics as primarily focused on responsibility for self. The "lack of inertia" in consciousness introduces a norm of strict liability for reason-sensitive mental states and an expansion in our conception of the possibility of ethical error. By developing an ideal of a non-objectified relation to oneself Sartre offers a novel basis for the primacy of an ethic of virtue over other normative ethical approaches. The extent to which Sartre is entitled to any ideal of character is analysed via his notion of a fundamental project. The development of a Sartrean notion of character is further analysed in the work of Stuart Hampshire and Richard Moran.
 
  2013 [22] with Edward Harcourt, 'Thick Ethical Concepts, Analysis and Reduction', in S. T. Kirchin, (ed.) Thick Concepts, Oxford University Press.
  Abstract: This paper argues that so-called thick ethical concepts are unanalysable and that the properties corresponding to thick and thin ethical concepts stand in a relation analogous to that of determinates to a covering determinable. Corollaries of these claims are that the evaluative is a subset of the descriptive and that there are grounds for rejecting an alternative genus-species model of the relationship between more or less abstract evaluative properties. It is not that thick concepts have a non-conjunctive analysis; they have no interesting analysis at all.
 
  2010 [21] 'Another Particularism: Reason, Status and Defaults', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Published Online 6th November 2010.
  Abstract: This paper defends moral particularism, arguing that there is an over-determined case for particularism based on the typically non-monotonic nature of practical reasoning, a general epistemological model that uses the idea of epistemic status and default entitlements and the idea of responsibiliity for one's character. This psychologised version of particularism argues that there is an ineliminable role for the first person in ethical judgement, that the idea of epistemic status is explained via the idea of a virtuous agent and that the idea of responsibiilty for character is incompatible with the truth of generalism.
 
  2011[20] 'Liberalism, Republicanism and the Idea of an Egalitarian Ethos' in M. O'Neill and T. Williamson (eds.) Rawls and Property-Owning Democracy, Blackwell-Wiley.
  Abstract: This paper extends a project of embedding Rawls's political liberalism in the wider framework of republican political theory. It does so by arguing that the most secure basis for the content of Rawls's two principles begins from the republican emphasis on securing the conditions for effective political agency. G. A. Cohen has, over a series of publications, presented a strong challenge to Rawls's egalitarianism. He has argued that the collective solidarity required for the adoption of the two principles is undermined by the special incentives permitted by the difference principle: those better off under a given distribution make it the case that they have to be incentivised to market their labour, tainting the resultant inequality as it arises solely from their anti-social preferences. It is argued that this critique can be deflected only by noting that a restricted scope of application for the theory of justice (the basic structure) is compatible with pervasive effects at the level of social relations. Properly understood there are no "justice free zones" in a Rawlsian society where exploitative bargaining is tolerated in such a way as to undermine an ethos of justice. The specific form of implementation of Rawls's egalitarianism, the ideal of a property owning democracy (adapted from the work of James Meade) illustrates this line of response to Cohen: markets are neither fair nor unfair, but the effects of market transactions are made fair by restructuring the distribution of capital and changing labour supply and demand. The most direct route to this solution is the overall point of reflection on economic justice: to secure freedom under law and effective political agency for all citizens of a republic.
 
  2009 [19] 'Perceptual Knowledge, Representation and Imagination' in 'Perceptual Intentionality: Themes from Sellars and McDowell', a special issue of Philosophical Topics.
  Abstract: This paper argues for the Kantian thesis that imagination is deployed in the context of 'direct' perception. There is a problem of how the whole of an object can be phenomenologically present in experience that is not solved either by a sensori-motor approach or a phenomenological theory that sees objects as drawing out responses by subjects. The relevant notion of presence is catergorical; these explanations make it dispositional. This paper argues for an enhanced representationalism, derived from Kant, that acknowledges the role of the productive imagination in direct perceptual awareness. Our intuitive idea that experience affords an objective grasp of a world not of our own making appeals, Kant argues, to the modal properties involved in objects being capable of unperceived existence. Bringing an object under a concept, classifying under kinds and “filling in” our experience of particular objects all use the productive, as opposed to the reproductive imagination (claims endorsed by Sellars and Strawson). This productive use of the imagination also explains how sensory features are taken as perspectival features of one’s experience.
 
  2008 [18] 'The Genealogy of Epistemic Virtue Concepts', in 'Epistemology Through Thick and Thin', a special issue of Philosophical Papers , edited by Ben Kotzee and Jeremy Wanderer, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 345-369.
  Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: Virtue epistemology attempts to explain central epistemic concepts by appealing to epistemic virtues. It is argued in this paper that epistemic virtues and the domains of epistemic goods with which they are correlated requires an account of "thick" concepts. Williams' account of such concepts proceeds, in Truth and Truthfulness, via a vindicatory genealogy of the practices in which such concepts are deployed. This genealogy reveals function where none was supposed and argues for a basic set of epistemic concepts that are universal, developed via a set of historically and culturally local articulations that are, by contrast, historically particular. This paper assesses this project of supplying a vindicatory genealogy for core epistemic virtues in the context of an inquiry-focused virtue epistemology. It explores the similarities and the differences between the interpretation of ethical and epistemic thick concepts.
 
  2009 [17] 'Consequentialism, Integrity and Demandingness', in The Problem of Moral Demandingness, edited by T.J. Chappell, Palgrave-Macmillan.
  Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: It is argued that a cognitivist and virtue ethical approach to moral reasons is the only view that can sustain a non-alienated relation to one’s character and ethical commitments. As a corollary of this general approach, I will argue that moral reasons must be understood as reasonably partial; a view of this general kind can, nevertheless, recognise the existence of general and positive obligations to humanity in general. This view offers a reasoned defence against the view that an analogy between obligations of immediate rescue and general and positive obligations leads to the conclusion that morality is highly demanding. The first section rebuts the claim that a life of integrity, is incompatible with consequentialism given certain very general facts about the current state of the world The second section develops the claim that an appeal to integrity might block the conclusion that morality is extremely demanding. Integrity is treated as a transcendental condition of beneficence more generally in the context of the other virtues. The third and final section turns the use of epistemological contextualism to defend an extremely demanding conclusion. This appeal to contextualism does not, in this case, add any further considerations that make the argument for extreme demandingness more plausible. I conclude that the general approach to normative ethics defended here can accommodate both duties of immediate rescue and general and positive obligations while not conceding that ethics is extremely demanding in a philosophically problematic way.
 
  2007 [16] 'Practical Irrationality, Reflexivity and Sartre's Regress Argument', Teorema, XXIV/3 October. ISSN: 0210-1602
  Abstract:Sartre famously criticised Freud's model of repression as involving an infinite regress. The postulation of a mechanism of repression does not solve the problem of how a person can both be influenced by a repressed thought (hence be aware of it) but not be aware of it (because it has been repressed). It is argued that it is Sartre's argument that leads to an infinite regress. This becomes clear if one focuses on his implicit model of rational control of thought. In assuming that thoughts we are conscious with are thoughts we are conscious of Sartre makes a representative mistake. This paper describes an understanding of Freudian repression that is not vulnerable to Sartre's critique.

La crítica de Sartre del modelo freudiano de represión como regresión infinita es bien conocida. La postulación de un mecanismo de represión no resuelve la cuestión de cómo una persona puede ser influida por un pensamiento reprimido (y por ello ser consciente del mismo) y al mismo tiempo no ser consciente del mismo (al haber sido reprimido). Se podría argüir que es el argumento de Sartre el que llevaría a una regresión infinita. Dicho argumento se hace aparente si uno se centra en su modelo implícito del control racional del pensamiento. En el supuesto de que los pensamientos de los que somos conscientes sean pensamientos que representan Sartre comete un error típico. Este artículo describe un entendimiento de la represión freudiana que no es vulnerable a la crítica de Sartre.
 
  2007 [15] 'Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance', Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol. 4 no. 1, April, pp. 77-84
  Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: A putative problem for the moral particularist is that he or she fails to capture the normative relevance of certain considerations that they carry on their face, or the intuitive irrelevance of other considerations. It is argued in response that mastery of certain topic specific truisms about a subject matter is what it is for a reasonable interlocutor to be engaged in a moral discussion, but the relevance of these truisms has nothing to do with the particularist/generalist dispute. Given that practical reasoning is plausibly a form of abductive reasoning, and is therefore non-monotonic, any arbitrary addition of information can change the degree of support evidence offers for a conclusion. Given this arbitrariness, it is no objection to the particularist if he or she represents the 'normative landscape as flat' in a way that does not display the 'obvious' relevance of certain considerations. The normative landscape is flat and our best account of practical reasoning represents it precisely as such. Appealing to a distinction between practical reasoning and moral reasoning does not help to resurrect this pseudo-problem for particularism.
 
  2007 [14] 'Introduction', in Bernard Williams.
  Abstract: this editorial introduction summarises the arguments of the contributors to the anthology and identifies some of the key interpretative issues in the assessment of Williams' views on non-objectivism, internal reasons, the psychology of shame and guilt and the critique of the morality system. It is argued that only a contextualist moral epistemology can avoid Williams' 'non-objectivist' undermining of cognitivism; that his internal reasons thesis is not based on Humeanism or instrumentalism and that his critique of the morality system attacks the 'hypergoods' underpinning Kant's view alongside the very concrete and specific target of the work of Prichard and Ross.
 
  2007 [13] 'Non-Objectivism and the Critique of Moral Knowledge', in Bernard Williams.
  Abstract: This paper critically assesses Bernard Williams' non-objectivist critique of moral knowledge in Ethics and the Limits of Philospohy. It is argued that adopting an inferentially contextualist epistemology avoids Williams' critique, offers a hospitable setting for Williams' own 'need to be sceptical', but depends heavily on the prospects for developing a plausible theory of error for moral belief. The outlines of such a theory are described.
 
  2005 [12] 'The Permissibility of Prerogative Grounded Incentives in Liberal Egalitarianism' in the 'Straight to the Point' section of Ethics and Economics, click here.
  Abstract: G. A. Cohen's critique of Rawlsian special incentives has been criticised as internally inconsistent on the grounds that Cohen concedes the existence of incentives that are legitimate because they are grounded on agent-centred prerogatives. This, Cohen's critics argue, invites a slippery slope argument: there is no principled line between those incentives Cohen permits and those he condemns. This paper attempts a partial defence of Cohen: a prerogative can be granted but then its operation internally qualified. A better off person has a prerogative that grounds incentive payment, but that person should be sensitive to the degree of difference between her resources and those of the representative worst off person (as represented in a minimum standard of living). This gives a better off person under a distribution a discretion that is then internally qualified by a commitment to an egalitarian ethos. The paper concludes that on balance this is not, in fact, a reasonable view of a prerogative: granting it and then qualifying it in this way undermines the unfettered discretion that should attach to a prerogative. However, Cohen has certainly identified an ambiguity in how we conceive of prerogatives.
 
  2005 [11] 'Reasonable Partiality and the Agents' Personal Point of View', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol 8, nos 1-2, April

pp. 25 - 43 . If you have access to "Springer Link' you can use this URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-3300-x


Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: It is argued that reasonable partiality allows an agent to attach value to particular objects of attachment via recognition of the value of the holding of that relation between agent and object. Such an explanation does not view the agent herself as capable of generating a disproportionate evaluation of objects simply because they are related to her. It thereby respects the objectivity and intelligibility of any evaluative claim. The reasonableness of partiality is ensured by a background context set by the agent’s virtues, notably justice. It is argued that reasonable partiality is the only view that is compatible with our best account of the nature of self-knowledge. That account rules out any instrumental relationship between moral demands and moral character, but that familiar claim is given an unfamiliar explanation. Instrumentality depends on a prior objectification of the self and it is that kind of objectification that, in the ethical case, represents a form of ethical evasion. Self-knowledge is transparent, incomplete and essentially connected with first person endorsement. The transparency condition is that knowledge of one’s state of mind is “taken” transparently to its object. More specifically, ethical transparency is the feature that my virtues do not exhibit themselves to me in self-knowledge, but take me transparently to the way in which they saliently represent the world as containing evaluative properties calling for various forms of response. It is concluded that reasonable partiality grounded in the nature of the virtues is the only reflective account of morality compatible with the most plausible account of the nature of self-knowledge. The demands of impartiality are incompatible with a condition of having a personal point of view, namely, that a self can stand in a non-alienated relation to itself via its capacity for self-knowledge. 
 

2003 [10] 'Nagel's Paradox of Equality and Partiality', Res Publica, vol 2 no 3 pp 257 - 284;

If you have access to "Springer Link' you can use this URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026273019708

 
Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: It is argued that Nagel' s pessimistic conclusion that current welfare state arrangements approximate to the most pragmatically effective way of reconciling the demands of morality and of an egalitarian liberalism, while not removing a deep seated incoherence between these view, can be resisted. The key part of his argument is his conception of the interface between morality and politics and the claim that the demands of impartialist egalitarianism are foreshadowed at the level of the ethics of individual conduct by the impartialist component of that view. The objective/subjective dichotomy, in this case applied via the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction, does the damage: understood in Hegelian terms as the "placing" of different categories of reason, even a minimal realism makes it difficult to understand how embedding agent-relativity alongside the agent-neutral can be understood as adding to the relevant values, just by moving from a more particular to a less particular conception of the world. This transition also cannot be seen as giving us insight into the intrinsicality of certain values, as that would be to renege on the idea that the subjective point of view is still a point of view on value and one that is expanded, not renounced. A more promising interpretation takes the move to the impartial standpoint to place two classes of reason in relation to a single category of value and this would connect Nagel's discussion to his contractualist model of political legitimacy. That process must involve "reasons we can share" and hence must be agent-relative reasons. It is argued that the standard objection that contractualism is fatally circular is even more plausible in the case of its use as a theory of political legitimacy and Nagel's use of it is quite open about this circularity. Criticising Nagel's philosophical anthropology allows one to develop his positive arguments for egalitarianism; the development of civic virtue, from a perspective in which "the personal" acknowledges the demands of others in one's political community, leads to a political egalitarianism located in a distinct political morality independent of a moralised politics.
 

  

2003 [9] 'An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness', Phenomenology and the CognitiveSciences, vol 2, no 3, pp. 161 - 185; 

 Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. One motivation is the Dretskean intuition that consciousness involves awareness not dependent on any reflexive intentional relation between a subject and mental state; another is that an adverbial theory of consciousness can avoid an act/object construal of such conscious awareness. An adverbial is described and contrasted with Mark Rowlands' similar distinction between actualist and objectualist construals of consciousness; the two views are very similar given their antecedents in Kant's distinction between inner sense and apperception. Adverbialism has also been defended as an interpretation of Brentano by Amie Thomasson; this view is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, Keith Hossack's Brentano inspired identity thesis. The paper then develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. This approach is contrasted to Shoemaker's functionalist treatment of the self-tokening of conscious states and of "self-blindness". It is argued that to be fully consistent, Shoemaker has to abandon the claim that introspectionism is guilty of a self-scanning model or rational control as he seems committed to that model too. The view defended in this paper is a person level acount of conscious self-ascription, not a "no reasons" view in which warrant is supplied by underlying cognitive mechanisms.
  This paper is also available from the ASSC e-prints repository.
 
  2002 [8] 'Internal Reasons and Contractualist Impartiality', Utilitas, volume 14, number 2 July pp. 135-154.
  Abstract: This paper interprets Bernard Williams's claim that all practical reasons must meet the internal reasons constraint. It is argued that this constraint is independent of any substantive Humean claims about reasons and its rationale is a content scepticism about the capacity of pure reason to supply reasons for action. Conversely, the argument can be interpreted as about what we are entitled to assume, for free, about the very idea of a practically rational agent. Hooker's and Korsgaard's critiques of Williams are considered and rejected as not considering sufficiently the prior commitment to content scepticism. The dispute between Williams and McDowell is separately discussed and identified in terms of psychologism, which Williams was happy to adopt for practical reasons, McDowell not, and whether appeal to the content of the reasons of a phronimos gives any purchase on the contents of an agent's reasons. It is argued that it does not and that McDowell's account of external reasons involves illegitimate idealisation. The final sections attempt a positive reconciliation of the internal reasons account with the motivation for external reasons, namely, securing practical objecitivy in the form of a commitment to impartiality. Impartiality is given a contractualist interpretation in the limited sense that socialised agents have a central disposition to hold those reasons that are defensible to reasonable interlocutors, but this is not a substantive constraint on their content.
   Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
 
   2000 [7] 'Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism' in Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason and Dale Miller (eds) Morality, Rules and Consequences, Edinburgh University Press;
    Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: This paper critically analyses Brad Hooker's attempt to undercut pluralism by arguing that any plausible set of prima facie duties can be derived from a more fundamental rule consequentialist principle. It is argued that this conclusion is foreshadowed by the rationalist and epistemologically realist interpretation that Hooker imposes on his chosen methodology of reflective equilibrium; he is not describing pluralism in its strongest and most plausible version and a more plausible version of pluralism is described and defended.
 
  

1999 [6] 'Values, Secondary Qualities and the Challenge of Non-Objectivism' in P. Kampits and A. Weinberg (eds.) Proceedings of the International Wittgenstein Symposium, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna;

    Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here. [Link forthcoming]
 
   1998 [5] 'Remorse and Reparation' in Murray Cox, (ed) Remorse and Reparation, Jessica Kingsley Publishers;
   Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
 
  1997[4] 'Kant, McDowell and the Theory of Consciousness' European Journal of Philosophy, (December) pp. 283-305;
   Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: This paper examines some of the central arguments of John McDowell's Mind and World, particularly his treatment of the Kantian themes of the spontaneity of thought and of the nature of self-consciousness. It is argued that in so far as McDowell departs from Kant, his position becomes less plausible in three respects. First, the space of reason is identified with the space of responsible and critical freedom in a way that runs together issues about synthesis below the level of concepts and at the level of complete judgements. This leads to the unwarranted exclusion of animal minds from the space of reasons. Second, McDowell draws no essential distinction between apperception and inner sense, a distinction which is important to a defensible Kantian view and to the very idea of a sui generis transcendental knowledge of the mind that is consistent with Kant's critical principles. McDowell does not take into account some of Kant's developed arguments about the inherently reflective nature of consciousness which is interpreted as an adverbial theory of the nature of conscious experience, a mode of being in a mental state (so neither an intrinsic nor extrinsic property of it). Third, McDowell endorses a standard treatment of Kant's approach to the mind in which a merely formal account of mind needs to be anchored outside consciousness on the physical body. The arguments for this conclusion, both in Mind and World and in related work by Bermudez and Hurley, is shown to be very inconclusive as a criticism of Kant. The capacity to self-ascribe thoughts that are already conscious shows, but does not say, a truth about the unity of our conscious experience that does not require further anchoring on a physical body; at that stage of the Critique Kant is describing conditions for conscious experience in general, not the conscious experience of spatio-temporally located makers of judgements. The alleged lacuna in Kant's arguments is no lacuna at all. [Note - this paper was written before McDowell's Woodbridge lectures, which offer a very different and far more sympathetic treatment of Kant.]
  This paper is also available from the ASSC e-prints repository.
 
  1997 [3] 'Minimalism and Quasi-Realism', Philosophical Papers, (November), pp. 233-239;
   Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: Expressivism's problem in solving the Frege/Geach problem concerning unasserted contexts is evaluated in the light of Blackburn's own methodological commitment to assessing philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits, notably quasi-realism's aim of minimising the ontological commitments of a broadly naturalistic worldview. The problem emerges when a competitor theory can explain the same phenomena at lower cost: the minimalist about truth has no problem with unasserted contexts whereas the quasi-realist/expressivist package does. However, this form of projectivism is supposed to be a local and contrastive thesis or the central metaphor of projection makes no sense. So in competition with minimalism, projectivism must - at least for non-contested areas of thought and language - presuppose non-minimal truth. This casts new light on Blackburn's proposal globally to revise the relations between logic and truth so as to model ethical discourse as tracking a notion of commitment to contents that can be either attitudinal or truh evaluable. Why globally revise logic, in order solely to explain the problem of unasserted contexts, when a rival view can do so much better according to the standards set by the quasi-realist? Why do so when a notion of non-minimal truth and a classical explanation of logic are already available to you, given the local and contrastive claims of quasi-realism?
 
  1997 [2] 'Liberal Republicanism and the Role of Civil Society', Democratisation, (August), pp. 26-44;
   Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: the political liberalism of Rawls and Larmore is presented as uniquely able to solve the problems of modern political theory. In the face of a plurality of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, a legitimate liberal state can legislate solely on the basis of a modular conception of justice affirmed from within each reasonable conception. However, it is argued that this view, while restrictive, has to permit the promotion of its own pre-conditions. This demanding duty of civic restraint requires citizens who have been educated for citizen virtue in the context of associational life in civil society. This challenge to expand liberalism to cover its own preconditions at the level of a moral background culture, has usually been levelled by one kind of republican/communitarian (Charles Taylor) or so-called "ethical liberals". It can be met by the adoption of a liberal republicanism that operates within the constraints of Rawls' political liberalism but nevertheless explains and justifies why such a view must treat traditional republican themes such as active citizenship and the importance of associational life. The solution lies in treating these values as option values, in a sense that is explained.
 
  1996 [1] 'Values, Reasons and Perspectives', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1996-7.
   Download the penultimate draft of this paper as a pdf here.
  Abstract: Peter Winch seems to have described the following kind of paradox. Two agents in a morally dilemmatic situation can agree on the values in that situation and their bearing on decision but come to different all things considered verdicts about what to do. Yet this kind of blameless disagreement is not a Protagorean relativism in which "right" reduces to "right for A" and "right for B". This paper tries to preserve the appearances while avoiding relativism, abandoning cognitivism about value or abandoning the "impartiality" of reasons. It is argued that Sen's notion of evaluator relativity in which outcomes differ in value according to whether one is the proposed author or viewer of the proposed action can be adapted to solve the problem. The sense in which values are perspectival is compatible with their objectivity as they systematically transform across viewpoints; Sen has correctly identified that the "author/viewer" parameter is perspectival in a different sense in which this kind of transformation test does not hold. However, a minimal realism about value suggests that Sen's insight is into the importance of an agency stance towards proposed outcomes. Practical reasons are perspectival in a more radical way than judgements of value, but still objective. Adapting his insight by explaining it as a claim about reasons not values solves the paradox while remaining cognitivist about values and impartialist about reasons.
 
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Conference and Seminar Papers
  2014 [42] 'Integrity, Impartiality and an "Objectified" View of Character', Conference on the Philosophy of Bernard Williams, April 21-22.
  2013 [41] 'Can a Property-Owning Democracy be a Realistic Utopia?' Rijeka, Croatia, November 29.
  2013 [40] 'The Realist Critique of Rawls', MANCEPT workshop, September 5, 2013.
  2013 [39] 'Why Practical Wisdom Cannot be Principled', Adelaide/Flinders Universities, July 19th
  2013 [38] 'Why Practical Wisdom Cannot be Principled', Zurich University Workshop on Moral Particularism (keynote) June 14.
  2013 [37] (with Machteld Geuskens) 'Testimony and Trust', TIlburg University Workshop on The Philosophy of Richard Moran, June 11.
  2013 [36] 'Contextualism, Scepticism and Semantic Blindness: Who is Bamboozling Whom?' Ethics Research Group, Tilburg University April 17th
  2013 [35] 'Rawls and Tomasi on Robust Economic Liberty', Tilburg University Workshop on Free Market Fairness, April 12th.
  2013 [35] 'Rawls and Tomasi on Robust Economic Liberty', University of Geneva, March 13th.
  2012 [34] 'Sen's Critique of Rawls's "Transcendental Institutionalism"', Tilburg University 'Fairness and Norms' Workshop.
  2012 [33] 'Politics Without Principles? Rawls, Realism and the Value of Democracy', University of Cambridge, June.
  2012 [33] 'Politics Without Prinicples? Rawls, Realism and the Value of Democracy', Tilburg University, May.
  2011 [32] 'Laws and Generalisations in Ethics', TiLPS, November 24th.
  2011 [32] 'Laws and Generalisations in Ethics', Stockholm University, November 8th.
  2011 [31] 'Trust and the Artwork',' Towards a Contemporary Aesthetic Education', Tilburg University, October.
  2011[30] 'Giving Each Her Due: Taurek Cases and Non-comparative Justice', BSET annual conference, Oxford, July 11-13.
  2010 [29] 'Thick Concepts and Arguments for Particularism', presented to the conference 'Intuition, Theory and Anti-theory in Ethics', Edinburgh, July 1-4.
  2010 [28] 'Virtue Ethics and the Ethics of Care'', presented to the research group 'Care and Contested Coherence', Tilburg University, June 2nd.
  2010 [27] 'McDowell's Disjunctivism: Neither Metaphysical nor Epistemic', presented to the AHRC project 'Phenomenal Qualities', May 21.
  2009 [26] 'Another Particularism: Reason, Status and Defaults', presented to the BSET annual conference.
  2009 [25] 'Nietzsche and Moral Fictionalism', presented to the conference 'Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity', Southampton, 10-11 July.
  2009 (with Edward Harcourt), [24] 'Thick Concepts and Analysis', presented to the conference 'Thick Concepts', Kent, July.
  2008 [23] 'Another Particularism: Reason, "Status" and Defaults', to be presented to the conference 'Ethics Without Principles', University of Paris I, Pantheon Sorbonne, May 10th.
  2008 [22] 'Self-Ascription and the Unity of Consciousness', 'Toward a Science of Consciousness', Tucson, Arizona, April 8 - 12.
  2007 [21] 'Perception and Imagination', presented to the workshop 'Having the World in View', University of Kent, May 18.
 

2006 [20] 'Inferential Contextualism and Moral Cognitivism', (Invited Keynote Address) Conference on 'Moral Contextualism', University of Aberdeen, July 3-5.

 

2006 [19] 'Consequentialism, Integrity and Demandingness', (Invited Plenary Speaker) Conference on 'Ethics and Demandingness', University of Dundee, July 14-16. Further details here.

 

2006 [18] 'Cohen's Critique of Rawls: A "Double Counting" Objection', Association for Social and Legal Philosophy Conference, University College Dublin, 29th June - 1st July.

 

2006 [17] 'Reconciling the Transparency of Consciousness and the Ubiquity of Self-Awareness', ASSC-10, Oxford, June 23-26. Details here.

  2005 [16] 'Reasonable Partiality and the Agent's Personal Point of View', seminar as part of the A. H. R. C. project on 'Partiality and Impartiality', University of Reading, Oct. 27.
  2005 [15] 'Maxims and Thick Concepts' Respondent at the Central Division of the A. P. A., Chicago. Download here.
  2004 [14] 'Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance', presented to the conference 'Moral Particularism' at the University of Kent, December 1, 2004.
  2004 [13] 'Perceptual Knowledge, Representation and Imagination' presented to the confence, Knowledge and Imagination, Free University of Amsterdam June.
  2004 [12] 'Recent Work on Kant's Practical Philosophy' presented to the conference, Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, University of Kent March 23rd.
  2003 [11] 'Reasonable Partiality and the Agent's Point of View' presented at the conference 'Reasonable Partiality', organised by the Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy, October 22 - 24.
  2003 [10] 'Consciousness, Reflexivity and Reduction' presented to 'Towards a Science of Consciousness 2003', July 6 - 10. Prague, Czech Republic.
  2002 [9] 'Imagination and the Sublime in Kant: Reply to Pacholec', presented to the Phenomenology and Cognitive Science Association Annual conference, Richmond College (July 22-23).

 

 

2002 [8] 'Kant and Shoemaker on Self-Ascription and the Unity of the Self', presented to ASSC-6 in Barcelona, (May 31st). More details of the ASSC here.
  2002 [7] 'An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness'', Consciousness In Historical Perspective, University of Kent at Canterbury, May 16.
   2002 [6] 'Liberalism, Republicanism and Equality', Association for Legal and Social Philosophy Annual Conference, Royal Holloway, University of London (11-13 April).
   2001 [5] 'Consciousness: Kant's Theory and Neo-Kantian Theories', 'Towards a Science of Consciousness 2001', Skovde, Sweden, (August);
   1999 [4] 'Values, Secondary Qualities and the Challenge of Non-Objectivism', International Wittgenstein Conference, Kirchberg-am-Wechsel, Austria (August);
   1997 [3] 'Happiness and Meaning: Reply to Susan Wolf', University of London conference on Well Being (June);
   1996 [2] 'Kant and the Theory of Consciousness', U.K. Kant Society, St. Andrew's (September);
   1996 [1] 'Democratic Citizenship and Civil Association', Centre for Studies in Democratisation, University of Warwick, (February).
 
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Contributions to Works of Reference 
  2010 General editor, Oxford University Press online Bibliography of Normative Ethics.
  2010 'Moral Particularism' (6000 words) Reed-Elsevier Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, edited by H. Svart.
  2010 'Bernard Williams' in the Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism, edited by James Crimmins.
   1995 'Bernard Williams' in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy;
   1998a 'Axiology' in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy;
   1998b 'Values' in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy;
   1998c 'Alasdair MacIntyre' in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
 
 
Editorial Work
  2003 Editor of special issue of The Good Society with Thad Williamson on Property-owning Democracy.
  2003 Editor of special issue of The Journal of Moral Philosophy with Simon Kirchin, on Moral Particularism.
  2003 Editor of special issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,'Consciousness in Historical Perspective';
  2005 'Editors Introduction' to Bernard Williams (Cambridge University Press)
    
  

 Reviews
  2013 Review of John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, Res Publica, August
  2012 Review of Charles Taylor, Dilemmas and Connections, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  2010 Review of Joseph Duke Filonowicz, Fellow Feeling and the Moral Life, Philosophical Books.
  2005 Review of Michael Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, Philosophical Books.
   2003 Review of Onora O'Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (online).
   2002 Review of Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor, Reason in Practice.
   1998 Review of David Copp, Morality, Normativity and Society, Philosophical Books, (April).
   1997 Review of J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison, World, Mind and Ethics, Philosophical Books, (April).
   1996 Review of Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain (Autumn/Winter).
   1996 Review of Paul Thompson (ed) Issues in Evolutionary Ethics and Michael Bradie, The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
   1996 Robert B Brandom, Making It Explicit, in European Journal of Philosophy, (December).
   1996 Review of Dieter Henrich, The Unity of Reason, Mind, (October).
   1995 Review of Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons, Mind, (July).
   1995 Review of Phillip Pettit, The Common Mind, Philosophical Quarterly, (April).
  1993 Review of Robert B. Louden, Morality and Moral Theory, the Times Literary Supplement, August.
 
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Other Publications
  2006 'Our Duties to Animals', The Guardian, March 7th, on-line here.
  2005 'What Does a Liberal Society Demand of Its Citizens?' Richmond Journal of Philosophy.
  2003 'Understanding the Research Process', an article on research methodology in Philosophical Writings intended for research students in philosophy. More details here.
  2002 'Is Your Mind Your Brain?' Richmond Journal of Philosophy, 2002, pp. 23-26
 
 
Presentations to Departments
  I have presented papers to the philosophy departments at Adelaide University (joint colloquium with Flinders), Amsterdam University, the ANU's Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, the Open University, Durham University, Birmingham University, Cork University, Geneva University, the University of Hertfordshire, the Welsh Philosophical Society at Gregynog, Leiden University, Leuven University, Oxford University, Sussex University, Tulane University, the University of Miami, the University of Missouri-St. Louis, the University of British Columbia, Vanderbilt University, Western Washington University and the CUNY cognitive science seminar. I participated in a workshop at Fribourg University (2009) and Stockholm University (2011) and have given papers to AHRC projects at Cardiff, Reading, Southampton and Hertfordshire. I gave a plenary talk at Dundee (2006) and a keynote address at Aberdeen (2006) and Zurich (2013).
 
 
Graduate Students
 

2013 Current Students: Machteld Geuskens (Tilburg) (NWO funded Ph.D) 'Knowledge Sharing: Right or Privilege?', 2012-2016.

Sean Gould (PhD) 'The Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics' ( 2013)

2010 - 12 Sander Voerman (Tilburg) (Ph.D) 'The Normative Will', graduated cum laude.

2005
[Co-supervisor with Professor Murray Smith] Dan Barrett PhD (Now at Copenhagen, details here).

2003/4 [Co-supervisor with Dr Simon Kirchin] Helen Frowe M. A. by Research.

2001 - 2003 Tomoko Kinoshiro M. Phil thesis

2002 Maria Zannia M. A. by Research

1993 - 1998 (All at King's College, London)

Mark Franks M. Phil

Paul Sheehy, M. A. by Research (Now at Richmond Upon Thames College).

Jennifer Griffin M. A. by Research

Jonathan Neufeld M. A. Thesis.

David Silva M. A. by Research

Craig Taylor PhD (Now at Flinders University, Adelaide, details here.)

Vincent Matthews PhD

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Membership of Professional Organisations
 
Member of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, the British Philosophical Association and the American Philosophical Association.
 
 
Conferences Organised
  2013 'The Philosophy of Richard Moran', Tilburg University June 11.
  2013 'John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness', Tilburg University April 12.
  2012 'Charles Larmore's Practices of the Self'. Tilburg University
  2012 'Democracy, Legality and Policy'. Tilburg University (with Stephan Hartmann and Hans Lindahl).
  2010 'Rawls on Property-Owning Democracy'. Tilburg University.
  2009 (April) Co-convener (with Kathryn Brown) of the Association of Art Historians Panel 'Aesthetics and Art History', Manchester.
  2007 (May) 'Having the World in View: Themes from John McDowell'.
  2004 (December) 'Moral Particularism', University of Kent. Papers and responses published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy. Funded by Kent Institute for Advanced Research in the Humanities, Analysis Trust.
  2004 Joint Session of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society: organised the Open Sessions.
  2004 (March) 'Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered', University of Kent. Papers laters presented at APA. Funded by Kent Institute for Advanced Research in the Humanities, Analysis Trust.
  2002 (May) 'Consciousness in Historical Perspective', University of Kent. Papers published by Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Funded by Kent Institute for Advanced Research in the Humanities, Mind Association.
 
 
Refereeing/External Examining
 

Book manuscripts reviewed for Oxford University Press, Blackwells, Cambridge University Press, Edinburgh University Press, UCL Press, Acumen Press, Macmillan, Continuum; journal refereeing for Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Contemporary Political Theory, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialectica, Disputatio, Mind, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, European Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Research, Kantian Review, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Philosophical Papers, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Philosophical Quarterly, Res Publica, South African Journal of Philosophy, Synthese.

External Examiner for the Open University, 2002 - 2007, London University BA (Internal and External) 2006 - 2008.

External Examiner for Reading University PhD thesis 2003, 2009; University of Melboune PhD thesis 2006; University of London PhD thesis 2007; Sheffield University, 2010. External Examiner for two London University M. Phil theses 2001, 2003.

 
 
(2) Employment History
  2013 - School Visitor, ANU Department of Philosophy (July-August).
  2010 - Professor of Ethics, Tilburg University, the Netherlands.
  2009 - 2010 Visiting Research Professor, Fellow of the Center for Philosophy and Public Affairs, the Murphy Institute, Tulane University.
  2007 - 8 Visiting Scholar, Philosophy Department, University of British Columbia.
  2003 - 2009 - Head of Department, University of Kent philosophy department. Appointed Senior Lecturer October 2003.
  2001-2    Arts and Humanities Research Board Study Leave Award.
  1998 - 2010 Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Kent at Canterbury;
  1993 - 1998 Lecturer in Philosophy, King's College, University of London;
  1991 - 1993 College Lecturer, St. Hugh's, St. Hilda's, Balliol and Corpus, Oxford University;
  1992 Visiting Lecturer, Universities of Keele and Birmingham;
  1989 - 1991 External Tutor in Philosophy for several Oxford Colleges, including Balliol, Exeter, Hartford, Lincoln, Lady Margaret Hall, Manchester, New, University, St. Anne's and Worcester.
 
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(3) Educational Record
  1995 D.Phil Awarded, University of Oxford, 'Contextual Models of Moral Justification'.
  1989 - 1995 D.Phil student Oxford University: Balliol College, Senior Jubilee Scholar, St. Hugh's;
  1987 - 1988 Kennedy Scholar, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
  

1984 - 1987 Entrance (1984) and Senior Scholar (1985, 1986) of King's College, Cambridge;

First in Parts IA, IB and II of the Philosophy Tripos. Awarded Richards Prize for finals result.

      
 

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